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Abstract. We give the first O˜( 1√
T
)-error online algorithm for recon-
structing noisy statistical databases, where T is the number of (online)
sample queries received. The algorithm, which requires only O(log T )
memory, aims to learn a hidden database-vector w∗ ∈ RD in order to
accurately answer a stream of queries regarding the hidden database,
which arrive in an online fashion from some unknown distribution D.
We assume the distribution D is defined on the neighborhood of a low-
dimensional manifold. The presented algorithm runs in O(dD)-time per
query, where d is the dimensionality of the query-space. Contrary to the
classical setting, there is no separate training set that is used by the
algorithm to learn the database — the stream on which the algorithm
will be evaluated must also be used to learn the database-vector. The
algorithm only has access to a binary oracle O that answers whether
a particular linear function of the database-vector plus random noise is
larger than a threshold, which is specified by the algorithm. We note
that we allow for a significant O(D) amount of noise to be added while
other works focused on the low noise o(
√
D)-setting. For a stream of T
queries our algorithm achieves an average error O˜( 1√
T
) by filtering out
random noise, adapting threshold values given to the oracle based on its
previous answers and, as a consequence, recovering with high precision a
projection of a database-vector w∗ onto the manifold defining the query-
space.
1 Introduction
Protecting databases that contain sensitive information has become increasingly
important due to its crucial practical applications, such as the disclosure of sen-
sitive health data. Privacy preservation plays a key role in this setting since
such data is often published in anonymized form so it can be used by analysts
and researchers. Several mechanisms have been proposed, such as differential
privacy, that allow for learning from a database while preserving privacy guar-
antees ([1,2,3,4,5]). At the other extreme are many results showing how database
privacy can be compromised by an adversary who is able to collect perturbated
answers to a large number of queries regarding the database ([6,7,8,9,10]). Ex-
isting results related to breaking the privacy of a database have several key
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limitations. For example, most assume that each query is represented by a vec-
tor q of D independent entries taken from some fixed distribution (such as the
Gaussian distribution or a specific discrete distribution), and that this structure
is known to the privacy-breaking algorithm. Also, most methods learn an ap-
proximation of the unknown database-vector w∗ that has L2 error ǫD for some
small constant ǫ > 0. Such precision is not sufficient to obtain o(1)-error on the
stream of T queries for T ≫ D, as is the case in our model. Further, the focus
has typically been on the offline setting, where the adversary first collects all
the queries, then applies some privacy-breaking algorithm, and finally uses the
reconstructed database-vector to compute good approximations of the statistics
he needs. From the machine learning point of view this means that the overall
protocol for the adversary consists of two distinct phases: a training phase and
a testing phase. Finally, the memory resources used by privacy-breaking algo-
rithms are typically not analyzed, even though this is a crucial issue for the
setting considered here, where the number of all the queries q coming in the
stream may be huge.
The goal of this paper is to present and analyze a database privacy-breaking
algorithm for a more realistic setting in which the limitations described above
are lifted. The entries of the query-vector are not necessarily independent. The
distribution D of the query-vector is not known to the adversary. The adversary
is not able to first learn the database-vector before being evaluated. Our algo-
rithm uses only O(log(T ))-size memory to process the entire stream of T queries
and therefore is well-suited to the limited resources scenario. To make life of the
adversary even more difficult, we assume that the database mechanism provides
only a binary oracle O that answers whether the perturbated value of a dot-
product between the database-vector w∗ and the query-vector q is greater than
a threshold that is specified by the adversary. Thus the algorithm has very lim-
ited access to the database even in the noiseless scenario. Dot-products between
query-vector and a database-vector are considered in most of the settings ana-
lyzing database privacy-breaking algorithms. Considering this more challenging
setting, we will show that much less than the noisy answer is needed to carry
out an effective attack and compromise data privacy.
In some of the mentioned papers an effort is made to learn a good approxima-
tion of the database vector with a small number of queries that is only linear in
the size of the database D. We use many more queries but our task is more chal-
lenging - we need much more accurate approximation, and get the information
only about the sign of the perturbated product as opposed to the perturbated
product itself. Finally, we are penalized whenever we are making a mistake. Our
goal is to minimize the average error of the algorithm over a long sequence of
queries so we need to learn this more accurate approximation very fast.
In this paper we present the first online algorithm that an adversary can use
to reconstruct a noisy statistical database protected by a binary oracle O that
achieves average error O˜( 1√
T
) on the stream of T queries and operates in logarith-
mic memory. From now on we will call this algorithm a learning algorithm. The
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learning algorithm is given a set of queries taken from some unknown distribu-
tion D defined on a neighborhood of the low-dimensional manifold that it needs
to answer in the order that they arrive (note that the entries of a fixed query
do not have to be independent). The learning algorithm can use the information
learned from previously collected queries but cannot wait for other queries to
learn a more accurate answer. Every received query can be used only once to
communicate with a database. The database mechanism calculates a perturbated
answer to the query and passes the result to the binary oracle O. The binary or-
acle uses the threshold provided by the adversary and passes a “Yes/No”-answer
to him. The error made for a single query is defined as: |zt−w∗ ·qt|, where qt and
zt are the query and answer, respectively, provided by the learning algorithm
in round t. As a byproduct of our methods, we recover with high precision the
projection of the database-vector w∗ onto the query-space. Our approximation
is within O˜( 1√
T
) L2-distance from the exact projection. By comparison, most
of the previous papers focused on approximating/recovering all but at most a
constant fraction ǫD of all the entries of w∗ which is unacceptably inaccurate in
our learning setting where T ≫ D. The assumption that queries are taken from
a low-dimensional manifold is in perfect agreement with recent development in
machine learning (see: [11], [12], [13]). It leads to the conclusion that, as stated
in [11]: “a lot of data which superficially lie in a very high-dimensional space
R
D actually have low intristic dimensionality, in the sense of lying close to a
manifold of dimension d≪ D”. Assume that the queries are taken from a truly
high-dimensional space. Then as long as the number of all queries is polynomial
in D, the average distances between them are substantial. In this scenario any
nontrivial noisy setting prevents the adversary from learning anything about the
database since a single perturbated answer does not give much information and
the probability that a close enough query will be asked in the future is negligible
in D. In practice we observe however that noise can be very often filtered out and
a significant number of queries can give nontrivial information about a database-
vector w∗. In this paper we explain this phenomenon from the theoretical point
of view. Our algorithm accurately reconstructs the part of the database that re-
gards the lower-dimensional space used for querying. We show that this suffices
to achieve average O˜( 1√
T
)-error on the set of T given queries. In our model, the
number of queries significantly exceeds the dimensionality of the database, and
therefore we focus on optimizing our algorithm’s time complexity and accuracy
as a function of T . Having said that, in most of the formulas derived in the
paper we will also explicitly give the dependence on other parameters of the
model such as the dimensionality of the database D and the dimensionality of
the query-space d. We are mainly interested in the setting: d ≪ D ≪ T . If we
use the O-notation, where the dependency is not explicitly given then we treat
all missing parameters as constants.
It should be also emphasized that, contrary to most previous work on recon-
structing databases based on the perturbated statistics, the proposed algorithm
does not use linear programming and thus gives better theoretical guarantees
regarding running time than most existing methods. The algorithm uses a sub-
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routine whose goal is to solve a linear program, however we show this program
has a closed-form solution. Therefore we do not need to use any techniques
such as simplex or the ellipsoid method. The algorithm is very fast: it needs
only O(dD)-time per query. More detailed analysis of the running time of the
algorithm as well as memory usage will be given in the Appendix.
2 Model description and main result
We will now describe in detail our database access model. We assume that the
database can be encoded by the database-vector w∗ ∈ RD. For definiteness we
will consider: w∗i ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, . . . , D. Our method can be however used
in the much more general setting, as long as w∗ is taken from some fixed ball
in L∞. Each query can be represented as a vector q = (q1, . . . , qD), where:
0 ≤ qi ≤ 1 and q21 + · · · + q2D > 0. Queries are taken independently at random
from the unknown distribution D (notice that entries of a fixed query do not
have to be independent). The distribution D is defined on some d-dimensional
linear subspace U ∈ Rd (d < D). The exact answer to the query is given as
a =
∑D
i=1 w
∗
i qi. For the t
th coming query qt the learning algorithm L selects the
threshold value θt and passes qt to the database mechanismM which computes
at = w∗ · qt. The noisy version a˜t of at as well as θt is passed by M and L to
the binary oracle O:
O(a˜t, θt) =
{
1 if a˜t > θt,
0 otherwise.
The value O(a˜t, θt) is then given to L. The learner records this value and
can also use the information obtained from previously received queries to give
an answer zt to the query qt. However it has only O(log(T ))-memory available.
Further, for a fixed query the learner only has one-time access to the binary
oracle O.
The noise ǫt = a˜t−at is generated independently at random and is of the form
DE , where E is some known distribution producing values from some bounded
range [−u, u]. The boundedness assumption is not crucial. Technically speaking,
as long as the random variable is not heavy-tailed (which is a standard assump-
tion), our approach works. In fact even this condition is unnecessarily strong.
This will become obvious later when we describe and analyze our method.
This setting covers standard scenarios where computing every single product
in the sum of d terms for w∗ · qt gives an independent bounded error. We should
notice here that in most of the previous papers the magnitude of the noise
added was of the order o(
√
D) (see: [6,7,8,9,10]). For instance, in [7] the authors
reconstruct a database that agrees with the groundtruth one on all but (2cα)2
entries, where α is a noise magnitude and c > 0 is a constant. Thus, even though
previous works do not assume that noise was added independently for every
query, the average error per single product in the dot-product sum was only
of the magnitude o( 1√
D
). This assumption significantly narrows the range of
possible applications. This is no longer the case in our setting, where some mild
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and reasonable assumptions regarding independence of noise added to different
queries and low-dimensionality of querying space leads to a model much more
robust to noise. We will assume that ǫt do not have singularities, i.e. P(ǫt = c) = 0
for any fixed c.
We need a few more definitions.
Definition 1. We say that a vector w computed by the learning algorithm ǫ-
approximates database-vector w∗ if |ΠU (w)−ΠU (w∗)|∞ ≤ ǫ, where ΠU(v) stands
for the projection of v onto d-dimensional querying space U .
Definition 2. Let Q be a probability distribution on the unit sphere S(0, 1) in
L2. For a fixed vector q ∈ S(0, 1) we denote by pQq,θ the probability that a vector
x selected according to Q satisfies: q · x ≥ cos(θ).
Definition 3. Take a distribution D from which queries are taken. Assume that
D is defined on the d-dimensional space U with orthonormal basis B. Denote by
Dn the normalized version of D and by Bn the normalized version of B (all vec-
tors rescaled to length 1 in the L2-norm). Then we define: pD,θ = minq∈Bn(p
Dn
q,θ ).
The error ǫq the algorithm is making on each query q is defined as the absolute
value of the difference between the exact answer to the query and the answer that
is provided by the algorithm. The average error on the set of queries: q1, ..., qT
is defined as ǫav =
1
T
∑T
i=1 ǫqi . Let us state now main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. Let q1, . . . , qT be a stream of query-vectors coming in an online
fashion from some d-dimensional subspace, where: 0 ≤ qti ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , d and
each qt is a nonzero vector. Then there exists an algorithm Alg using O(log(T ))-
memory, acting according to the protocol defined above, and achieving average
error:
eav = O(
1√
T
(rD
7
2 d+
√
D log(T )))
with probability psucc ≥ 1 − O( log(dDT )T 3 + d log(dT )T 30 ), where r = 2p2
D,φ
and φ =
2 arcsin( 1
64
√
d
).
We will give this algorithm, called OnlineBisection algorithm, in the next
section. Notice that φ is well approximated by 1
32
√
d
. To see what the magnitude
of r is in the worst-case scenario it suffices to analyze the setting where q is
chosen uniformly at random from the query-space U .
If this is the case then one can notice that pD,φ is of the order Ω(2−d log(d))
thus r = O(2d log(d)). If however there exists a basis of U such that most of the
mass of D is concentrated around vectors from the basis then standard analysis
leads to the 1
poly(d) -lower bound on p, i.e. poly(d)-upper bound on r (where
poly(d) is a polynomial function of d).
Theorem 1 implies a corollary regarding the batch version of the algorithm,
where test and training set are clearly separated (the proof of that corollary will
be given in the Appendix):
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Corollary 1. Let wT denote the final hypothesis constructed by the OnlineBi-
section algorithm after consuming T queries drawn from an unknown distribution
D. Then the following inequality holds with probability at least 1−O
(
log(dDT )
T 3
+
d log(dT )
T 30
)
for any future queries q drawn from D:
Eq∼D
[|wT · q − w∗ · q|] ≤
√
D log(T )√
T
.
In the subsequent sections we will prove Theorem 1 and conduct further anal-
ysis of the algorithm. Unless stated otherwise, log denotes the natural logarithm.
Algorithm 1 - OnlineBisection
Input: Stream q1, . . . , qT of T queries, database mechanism M and
binary oracle O.
Output: A sequence of answers (w1 · q1, . . . , wT · qt), returned online.
begin
Choose an orthonormal basis C = {e1, . . . , ed} of U .
Let φ = 2 arcsin( 1
64
√
d
).
Let Ii = [−
√
D,
√
D], N+i = 0 and N
−
i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , d.
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Output wapprox · qt for any wapprox = f1e1 + · · ·+ fded, where
fi ∈ Ii, i = 1, . . . , d.
if |Ii| ≤ log(T )√
Td
for i = 1, ..., d continue.
if ∃i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that arccos(ei∗ , qt‖qt‖2 ) ≤ φ then
Let m = maxf1∈I1,...,fd∈Id
∑d
i=1 fie
i · (−qt).
Let M = maxf1∈I1,...,fd∈Id
∑d
i=1 fie
i · qt.
Let b = O(M(qt), m+M2 ).
If b > 0 update N+i∗ ← N+i∗ + 1, otherwise update
N−i∗ ← N−i∗ + 1.
end
Let ∆p = P(− |I1|8D ≤ E ≤ |I1|8D ), Ni = N+i +N−i and
Ncrit =
30 log(T )
∆p2
.
if Ni ≥ Ncrit for i = 1, . . . , d then
Run ShrinkHyperCube(I1, . . . , Id, N+1 , . . . , N+d , N−1 , . . . , N−d ).
Update: N+i ← 0, N−i ← 0 for i = 1, . . . , d.
end
end
end
3 The Algorithm
We will now present an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that achieves theoretical guar-
antees from Theorem 1. Our algorithm, calledOnlineBisection, maintains a tuple
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of intervals (I1, . . . , Id) which encode a hypercube that contains the database-
vector w∗ (projected onto U) with very high probability. For each coming query-
vector qt the algorithm outputs an answer wapprox · qt, where wapprox is an
arbitrarily selected vector in the current hypercube. The query-vectors received
by the algorithm are used to progressively shrink the hypercube.
As the hypercube shrinks, vector wapprox ǫ-approximates w
∗ for smaller val-
ues of ǫ. When the hypercube is large the errors made by the algorithm will be
large, but on the other hand larger hypercubes are easier to shrink since they
require fewer queries to ensure that hypercube continues to contain w∗ (with
very high probability) after shrinking. This observation plays a crucial role in
establishing upper bounds on the average error made by the algorithm on the
sequence of T queries.
After outputting an answer for query-vector qt, the algorithm checks whether
qt has a large inner product with at least one vector in an orthonormal basis
C = {e1, . . . , ed} of U . If so, qt represents an observation for that basis vector;
whether it is a positive or negative observation depends on the response of the
binary oracle O. The threshold given by the algorithm to O is chosen by solving
the linear program maxy∈HC q ·y for q = qt and q = −qt, where HC is the current
hypercube. As we will see in Section A, this linear program is simple enough that
there is a closed-form expression for its optimal value. So we do not need to use
the simplex method or any other linear programming tools.
Algorithm 2 - ShrinkHyperCube
Input: I1 = [x1, y1], . . . , Id = [xd, yd], N+1 , . . . , N+d , N−1 , . . . , N−d .
Output: Updated hypercube (I1, . . . , Id).
begin
Let α = 34 , ∆p = P(− |I1|8D ≤ E ≤ |I1|8D ), p1 = P(E > |I1|8D ) and
Ni = N
+
i +N
−
i .
for i = 1, . . . , d do
if N+i > Nip1 +
Ni∆p
2 then
Ii ← [yi − α(yi − xi), yi];
else
Ii ← [xi, xi + α(yi − xi)];
end
end
end
The optimal values m and M of the linear programs solved by the OnlineBi-
section algorithm represent the smallest and largest possible value of the inner
product of the query-vector and a vector from the current hypercube. The true
value lies in the interval [m,M ]. By choosing the average of these two values
as a threshold for the oracle we are able to effectively shrink direction i∗. The
intuition is that if the query-vector forms an angle α = 0 with this direction and
there is no noise added then by choosing the average we basically perform stan-
dard binary search for q. Since α is not necessarily 0 but is relatively small (and
noise is added that perturbates the output), the search is not exactly binary.
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Instead of two disjoint subintervals of Ii∗ we get two intervals whose union is Ii∗
but that intersect. Still, each of them is only of a fraction of the length of Ii∗ and
that still enables us to significantly shrink each dimension whenever a sufficient
number of observations have been collected for each basis vector — specifically,
Ncrit observations — by calling the ShrinkHyperCube subroutine (Algorithm 2).
Every shrinking of the hypercube decreases each edge by a factor α for some
0 < α < 1. A logarithmic number of shrinkings is needed to ensure that any
choice of wapprox in the hypercube will give an error of the order O˜(
1√
T
). Notice
that Ncrit grows with T , which reflects the fact that for smaller hypercubes more
observations are needed to further shrink the hypercube while preserving the
property that it contains the database-vector w∗ with very high probability. This
is the case since if the hypercube is small we already know a good approximation
of the database vector so it is harder to find even more accurate one under the
same level of noise. When the hypercube is small enough (condition: |Ii| ≤ log(T )√
Td
for i = 1, ..., d) there is no need to shrink it anymore since each vector taken
from the hypercube is a precise enough estimate of the database vector.
Note that choosing an orthonormal basis C = {e1, . . . , ed} of U does not
require the knowledge of the distribution D from which queries are taken. We
only assume that queries are from a low-dimensional linear subspace U of d
dimensions. It suffices to have as {e1, . . . , ed} some orthonormal basis of that
linear subspace. There are many state-of-the-art mechanisms (such as PCA)
that are able to extract such a basis, and thus we will not focus on that, but
instead assume that such an orthonormal system is already given. Notice that
in practice those techniques should be applied before our algorithm can be run.
Since such a preprocessing phase requires sampling from D but does not require
an access to the database system, we can think about it as a preliminary period,
where evaluation is not being conducted.
4 Theoretical analysis
In this section we prove Theorem 1. We start by introducing several technical
lemmas. Their proofs will be given in the Appendix. We prove here how those
lemmas can be combined to obtain our main result.
We denote: hT =
√
T
log(T ) . Thus the stopping condition for shrinking the hy-
percube is of the form: |Ii| ≤ 1√
dhT
for i = 1, ..., d.
We start with the standard concentration result regarding binomial random
variables.
Lemma 1. Let Zm = Bin(m, p1), W
m = Bin(m, p1 +∆p) and µ1 = mp1.
Then the following is true:
P(Zm ≥ µ1 + m∆p
2
) ≤ e−m(∆p)
2
10 , (1)
P(Wm < µ1 +
m∆p
2
) ≤ e−m(∆p)
2
10 . (2)
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Definition 41 Let HC be a d-dimensional hypercube in RD. We denote by l(HC)
the length of its side measured according to the L2-norm (recall that all the sides
of a hypercube have the same length).
Next lemma is central for finding an upper bound on the average error made
by the algorithm.
Lemma 2. Let (q1, . . . , qT ) be a sequence of T queries. Let HC0, . . . ,HCs be a
sequence of d-dimensional hypercubes in RD. Assume that l(HCi+1) ≤ αl(HCi)
for i = 0, . . . , s− 1 and some 0 < α < 1. Denote l(HC0) = L ≤ D and assume
that s = 1
log2(
1
α
)
log2(L
√
dh(T )), where h(T ) is some function of T . Assume that
w∗ ∈ HC0
⋂ · · ·⋂HCs. Let E be a random variable defined on the interval [−u, u]
for some constant u > 0, with density ρ continuous at 0, and such that ρ(0) > 0.
Define φǫ(i) = P(−Lα
i( 14−ǫ)
D
< E ≤ Lαi( 14−ǫ))
D
for some constant 0 < ǫ ≤ 18 . Let
mi =
1
φ2ǫ(i)
C log(T ) for some constant C > 0 and let ki = mir for some other
constant r > 0 and i = 0, . . . , s. Assume that learning algorithm uses a vector
wapprox ∈ HC0 to answer first k0 queries, a vector wapprox ∈ HC1 to answer
next k1 queries, etc. Assume also that an algorithm uses a vector wapprox ∈ HCs
to answer remaining T −∑si=0 ki queries. Then the following is true about the
cumulative error ǫcum made by the algorithm:
ǫcum = O(L
2D
5
2 dr log(T )h(T ) +
√
DT
h(T )
).
In the following lemma we analyze cutting the hypercube according to some
linear threshold.
Lemma 3. Let w ∈ RD, let {v1, . . . , vd} be a system of pariwise orthogonal
vectors such that vi ∈ RD, ‖vi‖2 = L for i = 1, .., d and let HC = {w+
∑d
i=1 fiv
i :
f1, . . . , fd ∈ [0, 1]} be a d-imensional hypercube. Let e be a unit-length vector in
L2 that is parallel to v
1, i.e. e = 1√
L
v1. Let z be a unit-length vector satisfying:
z · e ≥ cos(θ) for some 0 < θ < π2 . Let 0 < β < 1. Define m = miny∈HC y · z
and M = maxy∈HC y · z. Let HCl = {y ∈ HC : z · y ≤ m + β(M − m)} and
HCr = {y ∈ HC : z · y > m+ β(M −m)}. Then for ǫ = 8 sin( θ2 )
√
d:
max
y∈HCl
e · y − min
y∈HCl
e · y ≤ L(β + ǫ) (3)
and
max
y∈HCr
e · y − min
y∈HCr
e · y ≤ L(1− β + ǫ). (4)
We are ready to prove Theorem 1 assuming that presented lemmas are true.
Proof. Let L = 2
√
D. Let us notice that the algorithm can be divided into
s + 1 phases, where in the ith phase (i = 0, . . . , s) all the intervals Ii are of
length Lα−i and s = 1
log2(
1
α
)
log2(L
√
dhT ). Indeed, whenever the shrinking is
conducted, the length of each side of the hypercube decreases by a factor 1
α
(see
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subroutine ShrinkHyperCube), the initial lengths are 2
√
D and the shrinking
is not performed anymore if the side of each length is at most 1√
dhT
. We will
call those phases: 1st-phase, 2nd-phase, etc. Notice also that the value of the
parameter Ncrit is constant across a fixed phase since this number changes only
when ShrinkHyperCube subroutine is performed. Let us denote the value of Ncrit
during the ith phase of the algorithm as ni. Notice that ni =
30 log(T )
∆p2i
, where
∆pi is the value of the parameter ∆p of the algorithm used in the i
th phase.
Denote by ki the number of queries that need to be processed in the i
th phase
for i = 0, . . . , s−1. Parameter ki is a random variable but we will show later that
with high probability: ki ≤ nir for i = 0, . . . , s− 1, where: r = 2(pD,φ)2 . Assume
now that this is the case. Denote by HC0, . . . ,HCs the sequence of hypercubes
constructed by the algorithm. Assume furthermore that w∗ ∈ HC0 ∩ · · · ∩ HCs.
Again, we have not proved it yet, we will show that this happens with high
probability later. However we will prove now that under these two assumptions
we get the average error proposed in the statement of Theorem 1. Notice that
under these assumptions we can use Lemma 2 with L = 2
√
D, h(T ) = hT ,
φǫ(i) = ∆pi, C = 30, mi = ni. We get the following bound on the cumulative
error:
ǫcum = O(D
7
2 dr log(T )h(T ) +
√
dT
h(T )
). (5)
Thus the average error is at most ǫav ≤ ǫcumT . By using the expression h(T ) =
log(T )√
T
in the above formula, we obtain the bound from the statement of Theorem
1.
It remains to prove that our two assumptions are correct with high prob-
ability and find a lower bound on this probability that matches the one from
the statement of the theorem. We will do it now. Let us focus on the ith phase
of the algorithm. First we will find an upper bound on the probability that the
number of queries processed in this phase is greater than ki. Fix a vector e
j from
the orthonormal basis C. The probability that a new query q is within angle φ
from ej is at least p = pD,φ, by the definition of pD,φ. Assume that ui queries
were constructed. By standard concentration inequalities, such as Azuma’s in-
equality, we can conclude that with probability at least 1 − e−2ui(p2 )2 at least
uip
2 of those queries will be within angle φ from e
j . If we take: ui ≥ 2nip , then we
conclude that with probability at least 1− e−2ui( p2 )2 at least ni of those queries
will be within angle φ from ej. Denote ui = nir, where r >
2
p
. We see that the
considered probability is at least 1− e−p
2
2 nir. Using the expression on ni we get
that this probability is at least 1 − e−30r p
2
2 log(T ). Notice that when ni queries
within angle φ from a given vector ej ∈ C are collected, the jth dimension is
ready for shrinking. Thus taking union bound over O(log(dT )) phases and all
d dimensions we see that if we take ki = rni, where: r =
2
p2
, then with prob-
ability at most d log(dT )
T 30
some ith phase of the algorithm for i ∈ {0, . . . , s − 1}
will require more than ki queries. Now let us focus again on the fixed i
th phase
of the algorithm. Assume that ShrinkHyperCube subroutine is being run. Fix
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some dimension j ∈ {1, . . . , d}. We know that, with high probability, at least ni
queries q that were within angle φ from the vector ej ∈ C were collected. Denote
by w∗j the j
th coordinate of w∗. Let Ij = [xj , yj] and assume that w∗j ∈ [xj , yj ].
Let us assume that the ShrinkHyperCube subroutine replaced Ij = [xj , yj ] by
I˜j . We want to show that with high probability segment I˜j is constructed in
such a way that w∗j ∈ I˜j . Denote l = yj − xj and δ = (α − 12 )l. Notice first
that if w∗j ∈ [(1 − α)l, αl] then w∗j will be in I˜j since no matter how I˜j is con-
structed, it always contains [(1 − α)l, αl]. So let us assume that this is not the
case. Thus we have either w∗j ∈ [xj , xj + (1 − α)l] or w∗j ∈ [yj − (1 − α)l, yj ].
Let us assume first the former. Consider a query-vector q within angle φ of
ej that contributed to N+j . Let us denote by p+ the probability of the follow-
ing event Fq: for q the oracle O gives answer: “greater than 0”. Observe that
the total error made by the database mechanism M while computing the dot-
product: w∗ · q is DE . Now notice, that by Lemma 3 and the definition of E ,
probability p+ is at most P(DE > δ − ǫl), where: ǫ = 8 sin(φ2 )
√
d = 18 . Thus
we get: p+ ≤ P(E > (α−
1
2−ǫ)l
D
). Notice that in the ith phase the hypercube un-
der consideration has the side of length exactly αi. Thus, since α = 34 , we get:
p+ ≤ P(E > (
1
4−ǫ)Lαi
D
). Let us assume now that w∗j ∈ [yj − (1 − α)l, yj]. We
proceed with the similar analysis as before. We see that the probability P+ of an
event Fq is at least P(DE ≥ −δ+ ǫl). Thus we obtain: P+ ≥ P(E ≥ − (
1
4−ǫ)Lαi
D
).
But now we see, by Lemma 1, using: m = Ni, p1 = P(E > (
1
4−ǫ)Lαi
D
) and
∆p = P(
−( 14−ǫ)Lαi
D
≤ E ≤ ( 14−ǫ)Lαi
D
) that N+i > Nip1 +
Ni∆p
2 is satisfied if
w∗j ∈ [xj , xj + (1 − α)(yj − xj)] with probability at most e−
ni(∆p)
2
10 . Similarly,
N+i ≤ Nip1+ Ni∆p2 is satisfied if if w∗j ∈ [yj , yj − (1−α)(yj −xj)] with probabil-
ity at most e−
ni(∆p)
2
10 . We can use Lemma 1 since (as it is easy to notice) in the
ith phase ∆p is exactly ∆pi = P(− (
1
4−ǫ)Lαi
D
≤ E ≤ ( 14−ǫ)Lα
i
D
) and p1 is exactly
P(E > ( 14−ǫ)Lα
i
D
). We obtain the following: the probability that there exists i
such that w∗ /∈ HC0 ∩ · · · ∩ HCi is at most: O(
∑s
i=0 e
−ni(∆pi)210 ). Substituting in
that expression the formula on ni, and noticing that the number of all the phases
of the algorithm is logarithmic in T , D and d, we get the bound O( log(dDT )
T 3
).
Thus, according to our previous remarks, we conclude that with probability at
least 1 − O( log(dDT )
T 3
+ d log(dT )
T 30
) OnlineBisection algorithm makes an average
error at most: ǫav = O(
1
T
(D3d
3
2 r log(T )hT +
√
dT
hT
)). As mentioned before, we
complete the proof by using the formula: hT =
√
T
log(T ) .
5 Conclusions
We presented in this paper the first O˜( 1√
T
)-error algorithm for database recon-
stuction in the online setting, using logarithmic memory and O(dD)-time per
query. It is designed for the highly challenging, yet very realistic setting, where
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the answers given by the database are heavily perturbated by a random noise
and there exists a strong privacy mechanism (binary oracle O) that aims to pro-
tect the database against an adversary attempting to compromise it. We show
that even if the learning algorithm receives only binary answers on the database
side and needs to learn database-vector w∗ with high precision at the same time
it is being evaluated, it can still achieve very small average error. We assume
that the query-space is low-dimensional but this fact is needed only to guarantee
that the term r = 2
p2
D,φ
from the bound on the error is not exponential in D.
The low-dimensionality assumption is indispensable here if one wants to achieve
average error of the order o(1) in a nontrivial setting with random noise. On-
lineBisection algorithm adapts next threshold values sent to the binary oracle O
to its previous answers in order to obtain good approximation of the projection
of a database-vector w∗ onto a low-dimensional query-space U .
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A Analysis of the running time of the algorithm and
memory usage
We start with the analysis of the running time of OnlineBisection. First we will
show that the linear program used by the algorithm to determine the threshold
in each round has a closed form solution.
Lemma 4. For any query-vector q, I1 = [x1, y1], . . . , Id = [xd, yd] and or-
thonormal basis C = {e1, . . . , ed} the value
max
f1∈I1,...,fd∈Id
d∑
i=1
fie
i · q
if given by
opt =
∑
j∈J+
yje
j · q +
∑
j∈J−
xje
j · q
where J+ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , d} : ei · q ≥ 0} and J− = {i ∈ {1, . . . , d} : ei · q < 0}.
Proof. Take some point: c1e
1 + · · ·+ cded, where: xi ≤ ci ≤ yi for i = 1, . . . , d.
For j ∈ J+ the following is true: cjej · q ≤ yjej · q, since: cj ≤ yj and ej · q ≥ 0.
Similarly, for j ∈ J− we have: cjej · q ≤ xjej · q, again by the definition of J−.
Combining these inequalities we get that for every point v in the hypercube HC
induced by I1, . . . , Id and C the following is true: v · q ≤ opt. Besides clearly
there exists v∗ ∈ HC such that: v∗ · q = opt.
Now let us fix a query q. It is easy to notice that q is being processed by the
algorithm in O(dD) time. Indeed, a single query requires updating O(d) variables
of the formN+i , N
−
i and computing the closed-form solution given in Lemma 4 in
O(dD) time. Computing dot product of the query with the given approximation
of the database vector clearly takes O(D) time. Thus OnlineBisection runs in
the O(dD)-time per query. Notice that OnlineBisection algorithm does not store
any nontrivial data structures, only segments: I1, . . . , Id, counts:N+i , N−i for i =
1, . . . , d and a constant number of other variables. The counts can be represented
by O(log(T ))-digit numbers thus we conclude that OnlineBisection runs in the
O(log(T ))-memory.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof follows from standard concentration inequalities. Let δ1, δ2 >
0. Note that E(Zm) ≤ mp1 and E(Wm) ≥ mp1 +m∆p. Denote µ2 = E(Wm).
Note that by Chernoff’s inequality we have: P(Zm ≥ (1 + δ1)µ1) ≤ e−
δ21
2+δ1
µ1 .
Similarly, P(Wm ≤ (1 − δ2)µ2) ≤ e−
δ22
2+δ2
µ2 . Take: δ1 =
m∆p
2µ1
= ∆p2p1 , δ2 =
m∆p
2µ2
.
Using these values of δ1 and δ2, we obtain: P(Z
m ≥ µ1 + m∆p2 ) ≤ e
− 1
1+ 2
δ1
m∆p
2
.
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Similarly, P(Wm < µ1 +
m∆p
2 ) ≤ P(Wm ≤ µ2 − m∆p2 ) ≤ e
− 1
1+ 2
δ2
m∆p
2
. Notice
that δ1, δ2 ≥ ∆p2 (the latter inequality holds because obviously: µ2 ≤ m). Thus
we get: P(Zm ≥ µ1 + m∆p2 ) ≤ e−
m(∆p)2
2(4+∆p) and P(Wm < µ1 +
m∆p
2 ) ≤ e−
m(∆p)2
2(4+∆p) .
Since ∆p ≤ 1, the proof is completed.
C Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Note first that for any d-dimensional hypercube HC ∈ RD of side length
l, two vectors: w1, w2 ∈ HC and a vector q = (q1, . . . , qD) such that: qi = 1 for
i = 1, . . . , d the following is true: |w1 · q − w2 · q| ≤ l
√
dD. This comes from
the fact that: ‖w1 − w2‖2 ≤ l
√
d, ‖q‖2 ≤
√
D and Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
ity. Thus we see that the cumulative error ǫ1cum made by the algorithm for the
first
∑s
i=0 ki queries satisfies: ǫ
1
cum ≤
∑s
i=0 kiLα
i
√
dD ≤ L
√
dDr
∑s
i=1miα
i.
Therefore we have: ǫ1cum ≤ CL
√
dDr log(T )
∑s
i=0
αi
φ2ǫ(i)
. We can write: ǫ1cum ≤
CL
√
dDr log(T )
∑t
i=0
αi
φ2ǫ(i)
+CL
√
dDr log(T )
∑s
i=t+1
αi
φ2ǫ(i)
, where t is the small-
est index such that ρ(x) ≥ ρ(0)√
2
for x ∈ [−αt8 , α
t
8 ]. Since ρ is continuous at 0, t
is well-defined. Notice that t does not depend on d, D and T , but only on the
random variable E and constant α. Observe that CL
√
dDr log(T )
∑t
i=0
αi
φ2ǫ(i)
≤
CL
√
dDr log(T ) t
φ2ǫ(t)
≤ 2CL
√
dD
5
2 r log(T )t
ρ2(0)α2t( 12−2ǫ)2
, where the last inequality follows im-
mediately from the definition of t (density ρ on the interval considered in the
definition of φǫ(t) is at least
ρ(0)√
2
thus the related probability is at least: the
length of that interval times ρ(0)√
2
, i.e.: φǫ(t) ≥ ρ(0)√2
Lαi( 12−2ǫ)
D
). Therefore the
considered expression is of the order O(L
√
dD
5
2 r log(T )). Now let us focus on
the expression: R = CL√dDr log(T )∑si=t+1 αiφ2ǫ(i) . From the definition of t we
get: R ≤ CL√dD 52 r log(T )Π , where Π = ∑si=0 2αiα2i( 12−2ǫ)2ρ2(0) . Therefore R ≤
32CL
√
dD
5
2 r log(T )
ρ2(0)
∑s
i=1 α
−i. Thus we have: R ≤ 32CL
√
dD
5
2 r log(T )
ρ2(0)
α
1−α ((
1
α
)s+1 −
1) ≤ 32CL
√
dD
5
2 r log(T )
ρ2(0)(1−α)αs . Using the formula on s, we get:R ≤ 32CL
2D
5
2 dr log(T )h(T )
ρ2(0)(1−α) .
Combining this upper bound on R with the upper bound on the previous ex-
pression, we obtain: ǫ1cum = O(L
2D
5
2 dr log(T )h(T )). Next let us focus on the
cumulative error ǫ2cum made by the algorithm for the remaining T −
∑s
i=0 ki
queries. By the definition of s we know that l(HCs) ≤ 1√
dh(T )
. This implies that
for any w ∈ HCs we have: ‖w − w∗‖2 ≤ 1h(T ) . Thus clearly for any query com-
ing in this phase the learning algorithm makes an error at most
√
D
h(T ) (again,
by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality) and we have at most T queries in this phase.
Therefore ǫ2cum = O(
√
D
h(T )T ). That completes the entire proof.
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D Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Denote: η = e − z. Note that ‖η‖2 ≤ 2 sin( θ2 ). Take first y ∈ HCl. We
have:m ≤ z·y ≤ m+β(M−m). Thusm+η·y ≤ e·y ≤ m+β(M−m)+η·y. Define:
m˜ = miny∈HC y · e and M˜ = maxy∈HC y · e. Notice that: |m˜−m| ≤ 2 sin( θ2 )L
√
d
and |M˜ −M | ≤ 2 sin( θ2 )L
√
d. This follows directly from the fact that: ‖y‖2 ≤
L
√
d, ‖η‖2 ≤ 2 sin( θ2 ) and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Thus we obtain: m˜ −
2 sin( θ2 )L
√
d+ η · y ≤ e · y ≤ m˜+2 sin( θ2 )L
√
d+β(M˜ − m˜+4 sin( θ2 )L
√
d)+ η · y.
Since, from the definition of M˜, m˜ and HC we have: M˜ − m˜ = L, we obtain:
m˜− 2 sin( θ2 )L
√
d+ η · y ≤ e · y ≤ m˜+2 sin( θ2 )L
√
d+ β(L+4 sin( θ2 )L
√
d) + η · y.
Therefore maxy∈HCl e · y −miny∈HCl e · y ≤ L(β + 8 sin( θ2 )
√
d). This completes
the proof of inequality 3. The proof of inequality 4 is completely analogous.
E Online-to-batch conversion
Throughout the paper we have considered the challenging online scenario, where
the algorithm both learns and is evaluated on a single set of streaming queries.
However, we note that the OnlineBisection algorithm also works well in the
batch setting, i.e. when there is a separate train and test phase. We prove here
Corollary 1, that for clarity we state once more:
Corollary E1 Let wT denote the final hypothesis constructed by the OnlineBi-
section algorithm after consuming T queries drawn from an unknown distribution
D. Then the following inequality holds with probability at least 1−O
(
log(dDT )
T 3
+
d log(dT )
T 30
)
for any future queries q drawn from D:
Eq∼D
[|wT · q − w∗ · q|] ≤
√
D log(T )√
T
.
Proof. This simply follows from the fact that, as argued in the proof of Theo-
rem 1, w∗ ∈ HCs with at least the probability indicated in the statement of this
corollary. Furthermore, by definition of the algorithm, we have wT ∈ HCs and
the length of the side of the hypercube HCs ≤ log(T )/
√
T . Thus, with at least
the probability indicated, |wT · q − w∗ · q| ≤ ‖wt − w∗‖2‖q‖2 ≤ log(T )T
√
D.
